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Financial Sector FDI 
and Host Countries: 
New and Old Lessons
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
n the 1990s, foreign direct investment (FDI) became 
 the largest single source of external finance for many 
developing countries.1 Most discussions on the causes and 
effects of FDI have focused on flows into manufacturing and 
real production sectors, where this type of investment has 
traditionally been concentrated. More recently, however, FDI 
into the financial sector has soared, and the sector is being 
reshaped dramatically.
 Financial sector FDI, a relatively new phenomenon, 
typically takes the form of banks in industrialized countries 
establishing branches and facilities in developing countries. 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, bank entry into 
Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s led to foreign 
ownership in local banking systems; today, such ownership 
often exceeds 80 percent of local banking assets. In addition, 
the liberalization of financial sectors in Latin America was 
likely spurred in part by foreign direct investment, especially 
in countries facing potential competitive losses to Asian 
economies. Within Latin America, the financial crises of the 
mid-to-late 1990s provided additional opportunities for 
foreign entry, as countries sought to recapitalize their banks 
and improve the efficiency of their financial systems.
1Other sources of external finance include bank flows, revenues from bond 
sales, and foreign portfolio inflows. For more information, see International 
Monetary Fund (2006).
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• The financial sectors of many developing 
countries are being reshaped dramatically by 
the rise in foreign direct investment, or FDI. 
￿ The growth in financial sector FDI, in which 
banks in industrialized countries establish 
branches and facilities in emerging markets, 
has drawn attention to the consequences of 
foreign ownership of banking resources.
￿ An analysis of research on “real-side” FDI—
investment into manufacturing and primary 
resource industries—suggests that lessons in 
these industries also apply to the financial 
sectors of host countries.
￿ Real-side and financial sector FDI can 
heighten the host country’s integration into 
world business cycles through improved 
allocative efficiency, higher technology 
transfer rates, and greater wages. In banking 
and finance, financial sector FDI can 
potentially strengthen institutional 
development in the host country through 
improved regulation and supervision.
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Chart 1
Value and Number of Acquisitions of Banks 
in Developing Countries by Source Country, 
1990-2003
Sources: Bank of England; Thompson Financial.
Note: The figures above the bars are the number of acquisitions.
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Banks in the United States, Spain, the United Kingdom, and 
other countries with highly developed financial systems are the 
main sources of financial sector FDI (Chart 1). Parent banks 
based in industrialized countries have assumed substantial, 
if not majority, control of assets in host-country financial 
systems. This growing trend is illustrated in Chart 2, which 
shows the evolution of foreign control of emerging market 
financial assets between 1994 and 2004. Whereas foreign 
control was typically below 10 percent of assets in 1990, it more 
often surpassed 40 percent by the late 1990s. Acquisitions of 
local banks continued through the early 2000s, significantly 
expanding foreign bank presence into majority ownership in 
many countries. From 1999 to 2004, the largest change in 
structure occurred in Central Europe, where the foreign 
ownership share rose to 77 percent.2
As one might expect, these dramatic shifts in investment 
into foreign financial sectors have raised concerns about the 
consequences of ownership of banking resources. In this 
article, we emphasize that some of the consequences are already 
well established in studies of foreign investment, although that 
work does not focus specifically on the financial sector. In the 
broad literature on FDI, the authors draw their results 
primarily from “real-side” investment—that is, activity in 
manufacturing and primary resource industries. And although 
a new line of inquiry is concentrating on financial sector FDI, 
2The history of and context for these developments are discussed in Bank for 
International Settlements (2006).
it typically ignores the lessons documented in the research on 
real-side investment that also apply to the financial sector. 
The stylized facts derived from the literature on the causes 
and consequences of real-side FDI are usually based on 
theoretical arguments supplemented by case studies.3 Within 
the economic research on this theme, the data studied are often 
from individual countries or from manufacturing industries 
within countries. Yet one limitation of real-side research is that 
conclusions seldom distinguish between FDI in the form of 
mergers and acquisitions and FDI in the form of greenfield 
(referred to as de novo in the financial services industry) 
investments. This limitation is relevant for understanding 
and interpreting the employment, growth, and efficiency 
consequences of FDI.
The emerging body of literature on financial sector FDI 
addresses some issues that have not received much attention in 
real-side studies. This research directly explores the cross-
border flows of products and the consequences of ownership in 
the financial services industry. It generally focuses on the 
implications of foreign entry into local banking systems, either 
from the perspective of the investing firms and parents making 
risk management decisions or from the vantage point of the 
host markets that are sometimes skeptical of foreign entry.4 
This article attempts to bridge some of the gap between 
research on real-side FDI and work on financial sector FDI by 
presenting a selective survey of the literature. We argue that 
real-side and financial sector FDI share many features. 
Accordingly, there are many lessons in the research that can 
benefit both fields of study. Moreover, because research on 
financial sector FDI is growing, attention could be focused 
on areas where real-side lessons are lacking or inapplicable, 
in which case real-side lessons need not be reinvented. In 
addition, we point to specific areas where financial sector FDI 
3The case studies employ distinct “definitions” of FDI, sometimes using a flow 
definition such as one covering the foreign investment that took place within 
a particular time period, or a stock definition meant to represent the total 
cumulative value of all foreign investment up to some point in time. 
Data availability often drives the type of analysis conducted.
4The insurance industry has also received significant foreign investment flows, 
but less research attention. For example, see Skipper (2001).
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has broader consequences—some that are quite policy-
relevant—and argue that these consequences need to be 
understood more fully.
Our review takes as its primary focus the host-country 
implications of FDI, especially for emerging markets. 
The implications span evidence on technology transfers, 
productivity spillovers, wage effects, macroeconomic growth, 
institutional development, and fiscal and tax concerns. One 
intention of the review is to emphasize the findings that have 
been presented independently in real-side FDI research and 
more recently in studies of financial sector FDI. While the 
language of these two distinct areas of analysis is subtly 
different (see box), we show that many conclusions drawn 
from them are strikingly similar. We also examine research 
in which no overlap exists between the two lines of inquiry 
and present conclusions from real-side FDI likely to apply 
to financial sector FDI. In addition, we comment on how 
both types of FDI may have different implications for host 
countries.
Our main conclusions are that real-side and financial sector 
FDI can induce limited technology transfers and productivity 
gains as well as have wage implications in the host country. 
Both types of investment can heighten the host country’s 
integration into world business cycles. Moreover, in banking 
and finance, financial sector FDI has the potential to strengthen 
institutional development through improvements to 
regulation and supervision. Banks provide key financial 
intermediation services, and their activities have externalities 
for bank regulation and supervision that cannot be overlooked 
(and certainly have come to the attention of host countries). 
These differences between real-side and financial sector FDI, 
more so than the similarities, warrant further attention from 
the research and policy communities. If the balance of evidence 
weighs in favor of making host-country financial systems 
healthier and improving intermediation—which seems to be 
true when robust and well-regulated foreign banks enter 
emerging markets—the governments of the host countries 
may wish to consider looking more closely at options for 
encouraging the benefits of financial sector FDI.
2. Does FDI Lead to Technology 
Transfer and Productivity 
Spillovers? 
Economists argue that multinationals, through FDI, can help 
to fill an “idea gap” between developed and developing, or host, 
countries and provide greater opportunities for growth in the 
host markets (Romer 1993). According to this view, producers 
in the developed country have access to productive knowledge 
that is not otherwise readily available to producers in the host 
country. However potent, such productive knowledge may 
be intangible, taking the form of technological expertise, 
marketing and managing skills, export contacts, coordinated 
relationships with suppliers and customers, and reputation 
(Markusen 1995). Technology transfers from FDI, economists 
contend, can stimulate growth in developing countries.4 Financial Sector FDI
This concept of technology transfer between countries has 
a long and rich research history.5 Nonetheless, studies of 
technology transfer reach mixed conclusions on the extent to 
which the transfers and productivity spillovers have occurred 
as a result of foreign direct investment in manufacturing and 
extractive resource industries. Some conclude that domestic 
firms in sectors with greater foreign ownership are more 
productive than firms in sectors with less foreign partici-
pation.6 Others dispute the spillover benefits of FDI into local 
markets.7 Part of the disagreement among researchers stems 
from methodological disputes, particularly the extent to which 
the studies properly control for the conditions in a country or 
sector that existed prior to the entry of the foreign investors. 
Sometimes foreign investment enters sectors where firms are 
ex ante more productive. Observations of ex post high levels 
of productivity in these sectors therefore offer no proof that 
foreign entry contributed to enhanced productivity via 
technology transfer or some other channel. 
On balance, research on real-side FDI supports the finding 
of positive productivity and technology spillovers into host 
markets. However, the level of these benefits depends on 
preexisting conditions among the host-country producers.8 
Small plants may have the largest productivity gains from 
foreign entry. Some local plants may lose workers and 
experience productivity declines. In some cases, the gains from 
foreign investment appear to be captured entirely by the joint 
ventures.9
Technology transfers also flow into local industries that are 
not themselves direct recipients of foreign capital. Indeed, the 
view that a new plant will stimulate the local development of 
5See Horstmann and Markusen (1989) for an early discussion and formali-
zation of this concept.
6See, for example, Blomstrom (1989) on Mexico.
7See Germidis (1977) for an early discussion of spillovers in the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development countries.
8Gorg and Greenaway (2004) provide a rich and more exhaustive review of the 
evidence on this point. They are more skeptical that the balance of evidence is 
positive, but also emphasize that methodological issues need to be addressed 
better.
9Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Harrison and Aitken (1994) provide evidence 
for Venezuela and preliminary results for Indonesia.
The “Language” of FDI
To understand why “real-side” and financial sector foreign direct 
investment (FDI) are so similar, first consider an FDI decision 
process. In each case, a foreign producer of goods or services makes 
a two-step decision. The producer begins by determining whether 
to serve a particular market and then determining whether the 
market should be served through exports or through the 
establishment of a local production facility requiring FDI. 
While manufacturers/real-side producers use the language of 
exports or production by multinationals as a means to satisfy 
customer needs, financial services firms use a different language for 
a similar decision process. In the financial services industry (in 
particular, banking), the bank first decides whether to provide 
lending, deposit-taking, and other services to a market. It then 
determines whether to serve the market through cross-border 
activities (arm’s-length transactions) or through foreign direct 
investment in the form of setting up branches or subsidiaries to 
engage in local lending. Banks produce services, not goods, so 
“export” transactions are sometimes not practical, especially when 
the information intensity of the transaction requires proximity to 
the client. Some banks specialize in screening and monitoring 
more opaque borrowers, making cross-border transactions—that 
is, exports—more costly than operating through a branch or 
subsidiary in the host country. Financial sector FDI thus entails 
either a de novo operation of introducing a new, licensed bank in 
the host country or the acquisition of an existing bank.
Although the language used to describe transactions is different 
for real-side and financial sector FDI, the decision process is 
similar. In both contexts, FDI is an activity that occurs as part of a 
multinational’s broader strategic plan. Flows can respond both to 
microeconomic stimuli, such as tax incentives,a and to macro-
economic stimuli, such as fluctuations in exchange rates and 
business cycles. The sometimes lumpy reallocation of capital across 
borders can occur when governments reduce their protection of 
inefficient or corrupt local industries.b Opportunities to gain local 
market share and exploit sales or production networks also trigger 
entry. These features are common to manufacturing industries and 
extractive resource industries as well as to financial services 
providers. 
aSee Feldstein, Hines, and Hubbard (1995) for analyses of tax and FDI 
issues.
bDixit and Kyle (1985) provide an elegant conceptual exposition.
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services and attract related producers is occasionally offered as 
a justification for (possibly excessive) incentive packages 
offered to foreign investors.10 Such positive “externalities” 
have been observed. For example, Javorcik (2004) shows that 
among Lithuanian firms, productivity spillovers from FDI took 
place through contact between the foreign affiliates and their 
local suppliers in upstream sectors, that is, through vertical 
linkages. This careful study finds no support for the claim of 
spillovers taking place within the same industry, sometimes 
referred to as horizontal linkages.
 This same logic should apply to the financial services 
industries. Instead of using the language of productivity, recent 
research on financial sector FDI considers whether foreign 
bank entry alters the efficiency of foreign-owned and 
domestically owned banks. Financial sector FDI typically is 
found to enhance the efficiency of banks that remain in 
business in the host markets. Efficiency calculations are 
performed by using data on overhead costs (the ratio of bank 
overhead costs to bank total assets) and bank net interest 
margin (bank interest income minus interest expense divided 
by bank total assets). Foreign banks operating in developing 
countries appear to be more efficient than their domestic 
counterparts, whether those counterparts are privately or 
government-owned. Domestic banks are forced to become 
more efficient after foreign entry, especially in the business 
lines in which foreign banks choose to compete. Among the 
relevant studies is Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga 
(2001), who use data from a sample of eighty countries to show 
that foreign entry reduces the profitability of domestic banks 
but enhances their efficiency. Country-specific studies that 
mainly use bank balance-sheet data reach similar conclusions, 
such as work on Latin America by Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg 
(2001), on the Philippines by Unite and Sullivan (2001), on 
Colombia by Barajas, Steiner, and Salazar (2000), and on 
Argentina by Clarke et al. (1999). Turner (2006) argues that the 
larger role of foreign-owned banks in Europe and Mexico in 
the past decade has made the banking industry more efficient 
and improved credit allocation. 
These financial sector FDI studies do not identify whether 
the productivity enhancements that occur in banking are 
10Such themes are developed in the elegant theoretical analysis of Markusen 
and Venables (1999) and in Rodriguez-Clare (1996).
attributable to increased competition among banks or to 
technology transfers between foreign and domestic banks. This 
distinction is important for assessing whether financial sector 
FDI is helping to close a knowledge gap between countries. 
The distinction may also help reconcile two potentially 
contradictory themes in discussions on financial sector FDI. 
One such theme is that financial sector FDI induces efficiency 
gains by changing an industry’s competitive structure: foreign 
entry reduces the monopolistic excesses of domestic banks. 
Bank exit or mergers and acquisitions change local competitive 
structures in ways largely unparalleled in other sectors that 
have received FDI. Another theme is that the significant 
amount of bank consolidation during the past decade has been 
fostered by technological change and foreign entry into 
emerging markets. Interestingly, Gelos and Roldos (2002) 
show that while such consolidation has been associated with 
efficiency improvements, it has not reduced competition in 
local financial markets. Foreign entry may be enhancing the 
productivity of other banks in the host market through the 
channel most often explored in real-side FDI research—
technology transfers—instead of exclusively through 
competitiveness changes. This issue is interesting from a policy 
perspective: If the main channel is technology transfers, 
productivity transfers and gains can continue as long as the 
parent banks innovate, even if a stable ownership structure 
exists in the host-country banking industry. 
3. Implications of FDI for 
Host-Country Workers
The productivity and technology transfer arguments lead 
directly to the question of whether foreign entry benefits local 
workers in terms of wages. When the foreign firm has some 
intangible productive knowledge, technology transfer and 
other training after entry should expand the human capital of 
the employees of the foreign firm within the host country. This 
expansion of human capital should manifest itself in greater 
worker productivity and be rewarded by higher wages. 
Studies of manufacturing industries link higher levels of 
foreign direct investment to higher wages. In Mexico and 
Financial sector FDI typically is found to 
enhance the efficiency of banks that 
remain in business in the host markets.
The productivity and technology transfer 
arguments lead directly to the question 
of whether foreign entry benefits local 
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Venezuela, wage growth was experienced by workers in 
foreign-owned firms, but it did not spill over more broadly 
through the host-country labor markets. In the United States, 
the wage effects from foreign investment were smaller and 
spilled over more into local labor markets (Aitken, Harrison, 
and Lipsey 1996). In Indonesia, wages paid in domestically 
owned manufacturing plants taken over by foreign firms 
increased sharply relative to wages paid in those plants that 
remained in domestic hands (Lipsey and Sjoholm 2003).11 
On balance, these studies conclude that some workers in 
manufacturing industries benefit directly from FDI through 
higher wages. Whether because of the accumulated capital 
being firm-specific or because of efforts by foreign firms to 
limit outmobility of productive workers, analogous growth in 
wages and productivity is generally not observed outside the 
sector receiving FDI.
While the same issues are relevant for workers in financial 
services industries, the topic has not been studied extensively. 
Bank balance-sheet data indicate that foreign bank operating 
costs are lower and that domestic bank costs are pushed down 
by foreign entry (Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg 2001). In some 
cases, wage expenditures also decline. The analysis has not 
determined whether these cost reductions are due to decreases 
in the number of workers (often a result of acquisitions and 
consolidations of banks) without wage declines or to 
reductions in employment with higher wages paid to the 
remaining workers. 
Research on real-side FDI has examined the employment 
effects of foreign direct investment. The overall implications 
for the host economy are the combination of FDI effects on 
employment by the specific firms receiving capital and on 
employment changes that FDI induces in the rest of the 
economy. Some implications are contingent on whether FDI 
takes the form of greenfield (de novo) investments or occurs 
via mergers and acquisitions of existing plants (or banking 
networks). Greenfield investments, where new plants or 
facilities are built, may generate increased host-country 
employment. This job growth might be strongest if the new 
plant does not compete directly with other local production 
facilities that serve thin host-country markets. Net employ-
11These results persisted even after the authors controlled for the initial 
characteristics of the plants taken over by foreign investors.
ment gains could also be strong if agglomeration externalities 
exist, so that the infrastructural improvements associated with 
FDI spill over to other local firms and all local producers gain.12 
The net employment effects of merger-and-acquisition FDI 
are less transparent. Mergers and acquisitions may trigger 
consolidation of an inherited bloated infrastructure, leading to 
job loss. Fewer individuals may be employed at higher wages 
in a plant or banking system that ultimately operates more 
efficiently. In the case of financial sector FDI, evidence reported 
by the Bank for International Settlements (2006) shows that 
this type of investment is often made through acquisitions of 
host-country banks. If financial sector FDI is followed by 
branch closures and reductions in wage bills after acquisition, 
it accords with this scenario. Yet such declines in employment 
by a bank do not necessarily imply reductions in total employ-
ment in host countries. The special role of banks in financial 
intermediation means that the employment consequences of 
financial sector FDI may be broader, and more positive, than 
the consequences of FDI to the real economy. This could arise 
if intermediation is improved and financial capital is allocated 
more effectively in the host country.
4. Do FDI Inflows Accelerate 
Macroeconomic Growth? 
The relationship between FDI and macroeconomic growth, 
and the stability of this growth, is a central consideration as 
host countries evaluate the trade-offs associated with foreign 
entry. One way this topic has been discussed is in the context 
of longer term performance, stemming from the argument by 
12Job creation by a single plant is generally not an appropriate welfare metric 
for employment calculations. The foreign plant employs workers and pays 
higher wages, drawing some workers from other local plants. In a situation 
where the foreign investor takes over a local plant, restructuring could 
lead to job loss, with only the remaining employees getting higher wages. 
The producer potentially generates larger income and tax revenues for 
local governments.
The special role of banks in financial 
intermediation means that the 
employment consequences of financial 
sector FDI may be broader, and more 
positive, than the consequences of FDI 
to the real economy. 
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Romer (1993) that an idea gap has held back growth in 
emerging markets. If an idea gap has impeded growth, the 
argument continues, FDI can induce a catch-up process. 
Indeed, the most robust evidence on FDI and aggregate 
growth is found in studies of developing countries. For 
example, analyses of inward investments to Greece, Taiwan, 
Indonesia, and Mexico show a significant positive contribution 
to these countries’ growth.13 Research using detailed industry-
level data finds that growth spillovers across industries depend 
on the industries into which FDI flows. The spillovers and 
growth ramifications are expected to be strongest when foreign 
affiliates and local firms compete most directly with each other, 
as may be the case in previously protected industries.14 
Borensztein, DeGregorio, and Lee (1998) find positive 
threshold effects between FDI and growth, with human capital 
accumulation in the host country needing to be sufficiently 
large before countries can reap the beneficial growth effects of 
the foreign inflows.
Studies of financial sector FDI effects conclude that growth 
may expand both through the technology transfer channel and 
through improved intermediation of capital flows between 
savers and investment opportunities.15 Cross-country growth 
regressions reach the broader finding that financial 
development improves economic growth.16 Demirguc-Kunt 
13The caveat to these results is that it is difficult to control adequately for 
reverse causality problems. More specifically, investors may put their resources 
into countries where growth is expected to be higher. See Lipsey (2000) for an 
informative overview of the literature.
14Markusen (1995) was an early advocate of the view that the competitive 
structure of an industry is a key driver behind FDI implications.
15A related area of research looks beyond financial sector FDI and considers the 
growth implications of overall financial liberalization. The issue of financial 
FDI, as opposed to portfolio investments or other forms of capital inflows, is 
not explicitly addressed. In this literature, financial liberalization events are 
usually defined in terms of regulatory changes, such as the relaxation of capital 
controls or the lifting of interest rate ceilings. Despite the considerable research 
undertaken, the extent of the long-term growth benefits of capital account 
liberalizations is hotly debated, and a consensus view has not emerged. 
Researchers have found sharply contrasting results owing to differences in 
country coverage, sample periods, inclusion of crisis controls, and indicators of 
financial liberalization. For recent examples and surveys, see Edison et al. 
(2002) and Eichengreen and Leblang (2003).
and Maksimovic (2002), however, find no evidence that 
country differences in economic growth can be explained by 
distinguishing countries by financial structure (that is, bank-
based versus market-based structures). 
Positive growth effects from financial sector FDI can occur 
because of more efficient credit allocation in host markets, with 
funds made more available for private sector use. Prior to 
financial sector liberalization and reform, some governments 
used the local banking system as a tool for providing directed 
credit to politically favored constituents or favored but loss-
incurring sectors of the economy. The banks implicitly play a 
role in patronage and “development finance” and subsidize 
levels of activities that might not be viable on market terms. 
Suggestive evidence of the costliness of such strategies is found 
in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silances, and Shleifer (2002). Using 
global data, the authors argue that a higher level of government 
ownership of banks is associated with lower growth of per 
capita income and productivity. Sapienza (2002), in a fascinat-
ing study of state-owned banks in Italy, shows that public bank 
lending has a pattern of rewarding political supporters. 
While serving as a means of fiscal stimulus, this type of 
directed lending crowds out intermediation to worthy private 
borrowers—a point also made by Mishkin (2005), who 
expounds on the principal-agent problems associated with 
directed lending. If foreign banks operating in host markets are 
better regulated and subject to parent bank oversight, these 
banks may be able to resist local suasion more effectively. 
As such, they may discipline host-country fiscal or monetary 
“irresponsibility” better and be less amenable to forced 
purchases of government bonds or forced lending to favored 
political constituents. Such outcomes are auspicious for 
sustainable economic growth.
A related finding by Galindo and Schiantarelli (2003) is that 
financial liberalization tends to relax financing constraints on 
producers in developing countries and make them less 
adversely influenced by financial crises. Foreign banks 
sometimes enter as a component of larger scale financial 
liberalization or bank privatization efforts and sometimes as 
local governments seek to recapitalize their financial systems 
16For example, see Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) and Rajan and Zingales 
(1998).
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in the wake of crises. Outside of crisis periods, foreign banks 
might be expected to contribute to growth by providing capital 
to worthy but previously credit-constrained borrowers and by 
not crowding out credit provision to worthy borrowers that are 
outside the scope of their business model. During crises, 
foreign-owned banks may be destinations for local flight 
capital, preventing this capital from leaving the country and 
creating greater opportunities for these funds to continue to 
be intermediated locally.
Research on lending comparisons across banks 
differentiated by owner types supports the conclusion that 
financial sector FDI fosters economic growth. Credit provision 
by U.S. banks to Latin American countries grew faster during 
the 1990s and was less sensitive to local cycles than credit 
provision by domestically owned banks (Crystal, Dages, and 
Goldberg 2001). The composition of credit provision is also 
important for long-term growth, raising the concern that small 
businesses relying on bank credit might have constrained 
access with foreign bank entry. In Latin America, foreign-
owned banks have been providing credit to local constituents 
in patterns similar to those of healthy domestically owned 
banks (Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney 2000). Detailed evidence 
for Latin American countries shows that other than possible 
biases in borrower orientation often linked to bank size 
(large banks lend relatively less to small and medium-size 
enterprises), there has been no systematic bias in orientation 
specifically associated with foreignness (Clarke, Cull, and Peria 
2001). In Eastern Europe (specifically Hungary), in aggregate 
foreign entry may even have been associated with expanded 
credits to small and medium-size enterprises when the 
domestic banks had to search more aggressively for a broader 
clientele for lending (Bonin and Abel 2000). Berger, Klapper, 
and Udell (2001) find that foreign banks in Argentina behaved 
significantly differently from local banks only when decision-
making remained in foreign headquarters. 
Overall, these observations support the conclusion that 
financial sector FDI should foster more rapid growth within 
economies. The conclusion is also supported by arguments 
based on better information processing, technology, and risk 
management practices.
5. FDI and Business Cycles
Foreign direct investment can also influence the pattern of 
business cycles in host countries, the transmission of cycles 
from foreign markets, and crisis contagion across markets. 
Analyses of business cycle comovements across countries look 
for explanations for changes in synchronization that have 
occurred across recent decades. Yet when developing countries 
are divided into two broad groups—more financially 
integrated and less financially integrated economies—both 
groups have low correlations with world macroeconomic 
aggregates, with these correlations not statistically higher in 
recent decades compared, for example, with the 1960s and the 
1970s (Kose, Prasad, and Terrones 2003).17 
The independent role of FDI, and specifically of multi-
national firms, in business cycle integration has not been 
explored as thoroughly. While Hanson and Slaughter (2004) 
posit a role for multinationals that relies on profit sharing 
between parent and affiliate firms, especially through wages, 
the strength of this channel has not been widely tested 
empirically or assessed relative to other channels.18 As a general 
point, the specific contribution of real-side FDI to business 
cycle linkages across countries, as opposed to financial 
integration more broadly defined, largely remains an open 
17Prasad et al. (2003) provide an extensive review of this evidence, noting the 
broad group of papers that look at financial integration and growth. The role 
of FDI within financial integration is less well documented. Imbs (2004) finds 
that financial integration raises correlations among a sample of industrialized 
countries. Kose and Yi (2001) argue that the increased vertical integration of 
production in world trade poses a powerful channel for business cycle 
transmission. Such vertical production linkages are frequently supported by 
patterns of general FDI and suggest that FDI in manufacturing and extractive 
resource industries stimulates business cycle comovements.
18The arguments draw from Budd and Slaughter (2000) on international rent 
sharing.
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question. Likewise, the relative importance of real-side FDI 
compared with financial sector FDI in changing the nature of 
local business cycles has not been determined.
In contrast, studies conclude that financial sector FDI 
clearly has consequences for local business cycles. This line of 
research typically uses bank-level data to relate lending 
activities to shock transmission within and across national 
borders. In principle, bank lending activity can either be 
procyclical or countercyclical with respect to local business 
cycles and other shocks. The availability of loanable funds via 
the deposit base contributes to procyclicality. However, if 
foreign bank entrants are less reliant on host-country funding 
sources and more reliant on foreign sources, the procyclicality 
of their supply of loanable funds may be reduced. Loan 
demand, too, can either be procyclical, as individuals or 
businesses borrow more to expand their holdings in 
prosperous times, or countercyclical, as individuals try to 
smooth consumption intertemporally.
Researchers generally find strong evidence of procyclicality 
in bank lending. In addition to the aforementioned points, 
other arguments for procyclicality rely on information 
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, as within a 
financial accelerator view of credit cycles.19 Or, as Borio, 
Furfine, and Lowe (2001) contend, procyclicality may result 
from inappropriate responses by financial market participants 
to changes in risk over time. These inappropriate responses can 
be attributable to market participants underestimating risk in 
good times and overestimating it in bad times. Inappropriate 
credit cycles can also derive from market participants having 
incentives to react to risk, even if correctly measured, in 
ways that are socially suboptimal. Related arguments for 
procyclicality stem from bank provisioning practices and their 
links to rules on regulatory capital (Cavallo and Majnoni 
2001).
The cyclical lending responses of banks could differ between 
foreign- and domestically owned institutions. Dages, 
Goldberg, and Kinney (2000) find that although foreign banks 
are procyclical lenders, they do not appear to magnify the 
19The financial accelerator argument maintains that information asymmetries 
between lenders and borrowers contribute to the procyclicality of lending. 
When economic conditions are subject to an adverse shock, and collateral 
values decline, even those borrowers with profitable projects have difficulty 
obtaining funding. 
boom-bust cycles in emerging markets. Analysis of individual 
bank data from Chile, Colombia, and Argentina supports 
broad similarities between the lending patterns of private, 
domestically owned domestic banks and longer established 
foreign banks. The similarities with newer, established foreign 
banks are less systematic. While foreign banks had higher 
average loan growth, they did not add significant volatility to 
local financial systems or act as relatively destabilizing 
lenders.20 In a study of the Malaysian experience, Detragiache 
and Gupta (2004) find that foreign banks with sufficient 
international diversification played a stabilizing role in host 
credit markets during the Asian crisis. By contrast, foreign 
banks that had a narrower focus on Asia behaved similarly to 
domestic banks. Arena, Reinhart, and Vazquez (2006) study 
bank behavior across twenty Asian and Latin American 
countries from 1989 through 2001 to compare foreign- and 
domestically owned bank activities. They find weak evidence 
that foreign bank entry into emerging markets contributes to 
credit market stability.
A related issue is whether financial sector FDI can reduce the 
magnitude of host-country cycles if foreign bank involvement 
reduces the actual incidence of crises. The boom-bust cycles in 
international capital flows are often derided as wreaking havoc 
on economies, with lending booms contributing to financial 
crises. Financial liberalization, by giving banks and other 
intermediaries more freedom of action and allowing them to 
take greater risks, is sometimes argued to increase the financial 
fragility of an emerging market. Studies by Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998, 2001), as well as work by Rojas-Suarez 
(2001), find that financial liberalization (defined as interest rate 
liberalization) has costs in terms of increased financial fragility, 
especially in developing countries where the institutions 
needed to support a well-functioning financial system are 
generally not well established. 
The transmission of shocks across borders is another issue 
that bears on financial crises. Foreign banks may contribute to 
contagion through common-lender effects, as documented in 
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003). These banks could also be 
subject to foreign cyclical flows. However, any private bank 
20See also Goldberg (2002), Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000), and Horvath 
(2002).
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with access to foreign loanable funds can be affected similarly: 
foreign cycles have been shown to affect the lending and 
deposit bases of domestically and foreign-owned private banks 
in emerging markets (Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg 2001). 
More evidence is needed on the question of whether foreign 
banks can, and do, receive additional capital from their head 
offices in times of stress. Accordingly, this topic warrants more 
rigorous study.
On the issue of crises, it is worth noting that foreign banks 
may contribute to domestic financial stability by operating 
within a country’s borders, rather than from abroad. If flight to 
quality occurs in stress periods, it may be better for domestic 
depositors to keep their money within the domestic financial 
system, to be reintermediated locally, rather than leave the 
country through capital flight. Peria and Schmukler (1999) 
document that depositors recognize differences in the health 
and efficiency of banks and move their assets to better 
functioning ones or demand higher deposit rates. Locally 
generated claims from foreign-owned banks substitute in part 
for cross-border flows, with the latter occasionally being more 
volatile.21
6. FDI and Host-Country 
Institutional Development
In theory, real-side and financial sector foreign direct 
investment can play a causal role in host-country institutional 
development. The direct role of real-side FDI in host-country 
institutional reform has not been well documented. Financial 
21More evidence is needed on the extent to which substitutability exists 
between cross-border flows and locally generated claims by foreign branches 
and subsidiaries. There are direct parallels between these questions in financial 
FDI and questions long raised in the area of real-side FDI. In manufacturing 
industries, there is no clear pattern of substitutability compared with 
complementarity in bilateral flows between Latin American countries and the 
United States. However, manufacturers in different countries may engage in 
distinct FDI strategies. Research shows that FDI from Japan enhanced Japanese 
exports to Southeast Asian countries, consistent with intermediate input trade, 
while FDI from the United States substituted for exports from the United States 
to Southeast Asia. FDI from these two sources did not systematically influence 
exports from the United States or Japan to Latin American countries (Goldberg 
and Klein 1998, 2001).
sector FDI has been more closely linked to institutional 
reforms, but systematic analysis of this response is warranted. 
The recent availability of rich institutional databases, such as 
the World Bank database on Bank Regulation and Supervision, 
may facilitate such testing.22
Nevertheless, institutions in developing countries can 
respond positively to financial sector FDI. Crystal, Dages, and 
Goldberg (2001) show that foreign-owned banks appear to 
contribute to the overall soundness of local banking systems by 
screening and treating problem loans more aggressively. If 
foreign entry spurs additional regulatory improvements, the 
risk of financial crisis declines. Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and 
Min (1998) relate foreign bank entry per se to the probability 
of a banking crisis. The foreign bank presence was found to 
have a negative and statistically significant coefficient, leading 
the authors to conclude that, after they controlled for other 
factors likely to produce banking crises, greater foreign bank 
participation had a stabilizing effect.
Mishkin (2005) argues that financial globalization should be 
an important supporting force behind institutional reform. 
He contends that domestic institutions, facing competition 
from abroad, will seek new customers to stay in business. 
For lending to be profitable, domestic banks will require 
information to screen and monitor their customers. Better 
accounting standards and disclosure requirements, as well as 
a more efficiently managed legal system, will be consistent with 
continued domestic bank profitability. Foreign-owned banks 
will also be a constituency supporting these positive reforms 
because, as outsiders, they would not have access to the same 
information as their domestic competitors. 
Numerous studies assert that financial sector FDI spurs 
improvements in bank supervision, with regulatory spillovers. 
The entry into emerging markets of foreign banks that are 
healthier than domestic banks implicitly allows a country to 
import stronger prudential regulation and increase the 
soundness of the local banking sector. In Argentina, Chile, and 
22See Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2002).
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Colombia, for example, foreign banks have contributed to 
enhanced domestic financial stability by engaging in more 
aggressive risk management techniques (Crystal, Dages, and 
Goldberg 2001). Calomiris and Powell (2001) argue that 
Argentina’s bank regulatory system in the late 1990s was one 
of the most successful among emerging market economies. 
Reliance on market discipline was viewed as playing an 
important role in prudential regulation by strengthening risk 
management among banks.
The transition to improved local supervision, however, 
might be bumpy. Major international banks may try to build 
market share by offering a variety of new financial products, 
including over-the-counter derivatives, structured notes, and 
equity swaps. These new derivative products can provide 
greater opportunities for hedging risks. Yet some new products 
may also be used to evade prudential regulations and take on 
excess risks, especially in countries with weak financial systems 
and underprepared supervisors (Garber 2000). One clear 
implication is that local supervisors in emerging markets may 
have to invest in upgrading their skills in order to evaluate 
more efficiently the use and effects of new products. Other 
challenges for supervisors arise in the context of relationships 
with parent banks, and may depend on whether the foreign 
entry is accomplished through branches or subsidiaries.23 
Foreign bank entry also raises issues of competition policy 
within host-country banking systems. While the actual 
experiences of host countries have been researched extensively 
(see Bank for International Settlements [2001] and the 
volume’s overview by Hawkins and Mihaljek), on average 
consolidation has occurred without deterioration of the 
competitiveness of a country’s financial services industry 
(Gelos and Roldos 2002). 
Another challenge can arise if a country’s financial services 
industry becomes highly concentrated, in which case banks 
may exert monopolistic pricing tendencies more extensively. 
If foreign banks are among the few surviving banks, local 
regulators may be tempted to conclude that these banks bear 
specific responsibility for adverse outcomes. Yet in many cases, 
23One recent study considers the stability of cross-border compared with FDI 
flows in banking in Central and Eastern Europe (Buch, Kleinert, and Zajc 
2003). In preliminary work, the authors argue that FDI should have an 
additional stabilizing feature because it should allow banks in these countries 
to draw on the liquidity buffer of their headquarters abroad. Branches and 
subsidiaries are not distinguished in the conceptual presentation.
foreign bank entry is part of a larger scale restructuring and 
recapitalization of the emerging market financial system. More 
concentrated market power may have occurred regardless of 
whether owners were foreign or domestic. Even with 
monopolistic pricing, there may be other benefits through scale 
economies and improved services that are by-products of 
consolidation. These issues challenge regulators to engage in 
careful cost-benefit analyses and policy reactions.
7. Fiscal and Tax Questions Raised 
by FDI 
Public finance decisions concerning multinationals24 and host-
country governments have received considerable analytical 
attention, particularly in terms of real-side FDI. One pertinent 
and very important issue is incentives offered to foreign 
investors to attract them to a country or a locality within a 
country. Such efforts have been extensive. As reported by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2001, 
pp. 6-7), nearly 95 percent of the almost 1,200 changes in 
national FDI legislation from 1991 through 2000 were 
favorable to foreign investors, sometimes taking the form of 
special incentives such as lower income taxes, income tax 
holidays, and import duty exemptions for foreign enterprises 
as well as subsidies for infrastructure. 
Researchers and policymakers correctly ask whether, 
quantitatively, the benefits of real-side FDI justify the costs. 
When governments compete actively against each other for 
FDI, profits from the investments are shifted from the host 
country to multinational enterprises (Oman 2000).25 While 
debate over this point is ongoing, Blomstrom and Kokko 
(2003) provide a compelling argument that the types of long-
term benefits generated by FDI may not justify the short-term 
costs. These benefits include the positive spillovers between 
firms and across sectors that researchers continue to identify. 
To compete effectively, governments may make long-term 
financial commitments that are excessive when compared with 
the employment and political gains received in the short term. 
Strong promotion efforts show that the government is 
actively doing something to strengthen employment, 
productivity, growth, or some other policy objective . . . .  
Another reason is that some of the perceived benefits (in 
particular, the jobs created by FDI) are easily observable 
while some of the costs (particularly related to tax breaks 
and fiscal incentives) are distributed over long periods of 
time and hard to measure (Blomstrom and Kokko 2003).
24See Feldstein, Hines, Jr., and Hubbard (1995).
25Similar arguments apply to states within countries that compete against each 
other to attract new production facilities.
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The same questions, to date applied almost exclusively to 
real-side FDI, are also pertinent to the financial sector. We have 
suggested a number of important dimensions along which 
financial sector FDI is expected to have implications distinct 
from other forms of FDI. These include reduced incidence of 
crisis, moderated business cycle magnitudes, and institutional 
development. Given the welfare consequences of business 
cycles and crises, the calculus of the costs and benefits of 
actively promoting and subsidizing such foreign entry is a topic 
worthy of further study. Analysis of the extent to which host 
markets encourage or tax foreign entrants, given their 
implications for local markets, could be explored for entrants 
during unstable as well as normal periods. If such analysis 
weighs strongly in favor of encouraging financial sector FDI 
from healthy parent banks, the arguments could satisfy some of 
the critics concerned about “fire-sale” terms on local market 
assets. The quantities that have been implicitly or explicitly put 
on the table for attracting financial sector FDI should be 
systematically studied for the lessons they can offer. 
8. Conclusion 
Our selective survey of the literature on foreign direct 
investment supports our argument that multinationals and 
FDI in emerging markets generally have important effects on 
the host countries, with some effects being particularly notable 
in financial services industries. These effects take the form of 
changes in allocative efficiency, technology transfer and 
diffusion, wage spillovers, institution building, altered 
macroeconomic cycles, and overall economic stability. 
We find that FDI is typically associated with improved 
allocative efficiency. This improvement can occur when 
foreign investors enter industries with high entry barriers and 
then reduce local monopolistic distortions. The presence of 
foreign producers may also increase technical efficiency: 
heightened competitive pressure or some demonstration effect 
may spur local firms to use existing resources more effectively.
FDI is also shown to be associated with higher rates of 
technology transfer and diffusion as well as with greater wages. 
While there is evidence of technological improvements from 
FDI and a presumption that such investment will consequently 
stimulate economic growth, the strength of these effects is 
disputed. FDI into host countries also induces higher wages, 
although these wage effects are sometimes limited to the 
foreign-owned production facilities and do not spill over more 
broadly.
Institutional change is another potential implication of FDI. 
At least in the context of financial services, the outcome is 
expected to be in the direction of improved regulation and 
supervision, with such improvements potentially sought by the 
remaining domestically owned banks as well as by the foreign-
owned banks. These improvements occasionally occur with a 
lag, as supervisors in the host countries at first may not be 
prepared to evaluate the new products and processes 
introduced by foreign entrants.
FDI can also affect crisis and noncrisis macroeconomic 
conditions. Foreign banks are procyclical lenders in emerging 
markets. Domestic, privately owned banks also are procyclical 
lenders, so the presence of foreign banks does not negatively 
affect the boom-bust cycle in lending and international capital 
flows. Foreign entrants may introduce a more diversified 
supply of funds, in principle making loan supply less 
procyclical but also more sensitive to foreign fluctuations. 
Foreign bank entry into emerging markets reduces the 
incidence of crises, but enhances the potential for greater 
contagion through common-lender effects. The contagion 
problem is reduced when foreign banks have a stronger 
subsidiary presence, as opposed to supporting local markets 
through cross-border flows.
The employment and growth effects of financial sector FDI 
are more subtle than other effects,26 depending in part on 
whether the investment is greenfield or merger and acquisition. 
In the latter case, the effects also depend on whether the 
acquired institution was financially sound or in need of 
restructuring, regardless of the nationality of the new owners. 
However, if financial intermediation improves, financial sector 
FDI should support greater employment and growth prospects. 
The institutional effects of financial sector FDI are 
potentially clearer and quite positive. Financial sector FDI from 
well-regulated and well-supervised source countries can 
support emerging market institutional development and 
governance, improve a host country’s mix of financial services 
and risk management tools, and potentially reduce the 
incidence of sharp crises associated with financial 
26If FDI evidence in manufacturing is a guide, Kokko (1994) shows that the 
incidence of spillovers is associated with a host country’s ability to absorb 
them.
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underdevelopment in emerging markets. Yet this type of 
investment can initially pose formidable challenges to local 
supervisors, who may need to develop expertise in the practices 
and products introduced into their economies. 
Finally, whether governments should actively pursue FDI 
through subsidies and other incentive programs is a subject of 
strong debate. There is some skepticism in the literature on 
real-side FDI about whether the benefits of investment to the 
host country justify the sometimes large incentives offered to 
attract foreign investors. The special features of financial sector 
FDI add other dimensions to this debate, and accordingly 
warrant further exploration.
These findings will hopefully contribute to discussions 
about whether developing countries should open their 
financial sectors to foreign entrants. The evidence suggests 
that many emerging markets have responded with strong 
affirmative statements in the past decade. It also suggests that 
the benefits of financial sector FDI can be substantial enough 
for a country to encourage and support entry from well-
regulated and healthy banks. Careful discussion and further 
rigorous analysis will no doubt continue to inform these 
important issues. References
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